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Welfare Home Visit
After an initial interview to determine eligibility, the major contact
between welfare agency and recipient is the series of mandatory home
visits made by the caseworker at regular intervals. These visits are the
heart of welfare administration. Through them are channeled all the
functions of the caseworker, from redetermining eligibility to pro-
viding a wide variety of services.
The home visit is especially suited to the provision of services: it
gives the administration of welfare a personal, rehabilitative orienta-
tion, unlike that of most federal programs. Despite this orientation, a
home visit was dramatically recharacterized as an unreasonable search
in a recent federal case, James v. Goldberg.1 By upholding this decision
the Supreme Court could force a drastic reorganization of the whole
system of welfare administration.
I.
Home visiting is the practice that most clearly embodies the unique
rehabilitative cast of public assistance programs. Ever since their enact-
ment under the 1936 Social Security Act, these programs have been
regarded as conceptually different from the contributory schemes of
social insurance.2 Social insurance programs presuppose that most
people are able to provide for future contingencies by fixed contribu-
tions to an insurance scheme. Public assistance programs help those
beyond the reach of social insurance-those people confronting crisis
1. 03 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
In James a recipient of AFDC benefits received a request from her caseworker for an
appointment to visit at a specific future date. Plaintiff responded that she was willing
to supply any information relevant to her receipt of benefits, but would not consent to a
home visit. Soon after, the plaintiff received a "notice of intent to discontinue" her AFDC
benefits, and a subsequent administrative panel upheld the caseworker's decision, Tile
recipient petitioned the district court to enjoin termination of her benefits. A threc-judge
court granted the injunction, ruling that the mandatory home visit is a search and that
the state cannot condition the initial and continuing receipt of aid upon a waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights. The state has appealed, and the Supreme Court has noted
probable jurisdiction sub nom. Wyman v. James, 38 US.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970),
2. ten Brock, The 1956 Amendments to the Social Security Act: After the New
Look-the First Thought, 6 J. PuB. L. 123 (1957); Handler 8- Rosenheim, Privacy in
Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Justice, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 177, 387
(1966); Kahn, Social Services in Relation to Income Security: Introductory Notes, 39 Soo.
Srav. REv. 381, 383-85 (1965). See ten Brock & Wilson, Public Assistance and Social In-
surance: A Normative Evaluation, 1 U.C.LA.L. Ray.. 237 (1954).
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situations and those who are for some reason unable to participate in
social insurance. While social insurance is geared to the average needs
of large numbers of people, public assistance is directed to the peculiar
needs of individuals whose financial dependence is supposedly caused
by personal inadequacies rather than by general social or economic
flaws.3
Perhaps because of the strong emphasis on individual need, the legis-
lative framework of the welfare program provides only a minimal out-
line for its administration.4 The administrator of public assistance is
not a government functionary, as in social insurance, but a trained
public caseworker.5 From the start, the program has been defined by
the on-going caseworker-client relationship rather than by fixed legis-
lative standards. The home visit, though not specifically required by
either federal regulations or legislation, quickly became important in
public assistance and particularly in the Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children program (AFDC).7 Individualized casework treatment
S. ten Broek, The 1956 Amendments to the Social Security Act: After the New Looh-
the First Thought, 6 J. PuB. L. 123, 128 (1957).
4. Id. at 128.
5. The profession of social work has played an important role in shaping the admin-
istration of public assistance policies, despite the fact that few workers primarily engaged
in public assistance work are fully trained. W. BELL, AID to DEPENDwr CiiLDFN 155
(1965); A. KErm-LucAs, DEciSIoNs ABour POPLE IN NEED 29-32 (1957); Keifh-Lucas, The
Political Theory Implicit in Social Casework Theory, 47 Air. Po. Scx. REv. 1076. 10S0
(1953).
6. The federal rules require only that there be periodic redeterminations of eligibility.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PuBuc Ass bTAnc AD.
maIsrRATIoN pt. IV, § 2200(d) [hereinafter cited as HANDnOOK]. On the administrative
origins of home visits see Stein, Eligibility Determinations in Public Assistance, 115 U. PA.
L. Rxv. 1807, 1309 n.15 (1967).
The structure of welfare law is such that most of the actual administration of the pro-
gram is framed by state and local authorities rather than the federal government. The
Social Security Act provides only a vague framework for a states categorical assistance
programs: old age assistance (OAA), aid to families with dependent children (AFDC), aid
to the blind (AB), and aid for the permanently and totally disabled (APTD). A state is
required to flfill the provisions of the Act in order to qualify for federal haring of the
costs of the program. The Federal Handbook of Public Assistance Administration repre-
sents the offiia interpretations of the Act by the Department of Health, Education and
WVelfare; whle for the most part these regulations are permissive rather than mandatory.
a state may be required to comply with some provisions of te Handbook prior to re-
ceiving federal money. (At the present time the Handbook isbeing phased out and new
regulations are being published in the Code of Federal Regulations; parts of the Hand-
book that are not superseded by new additions to the Code remain legally enforceable.)
Authorization for, and a description of welfare programs is found in state enabling
legislation. Finally, the administrative regulations specifically shaping the behavior of
caseworker to client are found in state administrative codes and/or in individual state
public assistance manuals.
7. The home visit was an administrative practice in the Mothers' Pension Movement
prior to the Social Security Act of 1936. "Determination of eligibility was only part of
the [investigator's] task. The investigator was also responsible for visiting the family after
grants had been approved to make certain that adequate standards of home care and
parental conduct were maintained. In part these visits fulfilled the requirement for a
routine review of eligibility;, they were also intended to be supervisory, encouraging,
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necessitates an understanding of the client's total environment, in-
cluding a complete picture of the circumstances of "family inter-
action."s
The 1956 Amendments to the Social Security Act, by adding a variety
of social service provisions to public assistance, made explicit what had
been implicit in the initial program.0 Before 1956, the federal statute
had specified income maintenance as the only goal of public assis-
tance; 10 individual states provided for additional services but most of
the programs they established were poorly funded and ineffective.11 With
the 1956 Amendments Congress recognized services as an integral part
of public assistance and offered to share with the states the costs of
providing them.12 This more pronounced service orientation gave re-
doubled importance to the practice of home visiting;13 a productive
caseworker-client relationship was seen as pivotal in fostering self-care,
"self-support" and "strengthening of family life," the new goals of
the program."
Arguably, the welfare home visit has little in common with the
usual "search." Each of the functions of a home visit-including the
verification of eligibility-could be construed as furthering the overall
assisting, so that mothers would be helped to maintain 'suitable' homes," BELL, supra note
5, at 11. The AFDC program enacted after 1936 was then a direct descendant of the
Mothers' Pension Movement. Id. at 153, 154. While the characteristics described here are
general throughout welfare, it is clear that they have special applicability to the AFDC
program. Handler & Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Jus.
tice, 31 LAw & ComrEMp. PROB. 377, 387, 388 (1966).
8. The practice of home visiting has been described as "serving a diagnostic purpose
in that it provides a picture of environmental influences and family interaction." Levine,
Treatment in 'the Home, 9 SOCIAL WoRK 19 (Jan. 1964). In social work schools espousing
"aggressive casework" the home visit would appear to be an especially important tool.
See Miller, Value Dilemmas in Social Casework, 13 SOCIAL WORK 29 (Jan. 1968), Schorr,
The Trend to R., 7 SOCIAL WORK 60 (Jan. 1962); Wiltse, The Hopeless Family, 3 SOCIAL
WORK 16 (Oct. 1958). See also Keith-Lucas, The Political Theory Implicit in Social Case-
work Theory, 47 Am. POL. Sm. REV. 1076 (1953); W. FRIEDLANDER, INTRODUCTION To SOCIAL
WELrFARE 155-58 (1968).
9. 70 Stat. 848 (1956), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S,C. §§ 602,
603, 606 (Supp. I, 1965).
10. BELL, supra note 5, at 153.
11. Id. at 153-54.
12. 70 Stat. 848 (1956), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964).
13. The requirement of a "social service plan" for every AFDC family was added In
1962: "A State plan .., must... (13) provide for the development and application of a
program for such welfare and related services for each child who receives aid to fanilles
with dependent children as may be necessary in light of the particular home conditiong
and other needs of such child .... " 76 Stat. 185 (1962), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(13) (1964). The
home visit is generally seen as the vehicle by which information relevant to the "social
service plan" may be gathered. See 18 NYCRR §§ 351.10, 351.21(c)(7).
Bell describes the extent to which the service provisions gave new emphasis to the
professional caseworker and casework methods. BE.x., supra note 5, at 154-55,
14. 70 Stat. 848 (1956), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964). See Handler F Hollings.
worth, The Administration of Social Services and the Structure of Dependency: the Views
of AFDC Recipients, 43 Soc. Sav. Rav. 406 (1969).
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benevolent goals of the practice. Thus, verifying eligibility is simply
the obverse of ensuring that the client has all he is entitled to receive,
and information gathered for either purpose is helpful for recom-
mending social services.25 The welfare manual in Wisconsin, for ex-
ample, classifies virtually every aspect of AFDC administration as a
service; the administration of eligibility, supervision of budget and
even relatives' responsibility laws'0 are rehabilitative, if "properly car-
ried out" by trained caseworkers.1r
Furthermore, investigation plays only a minor role in the actual
conduct of home visits. In some areas, caseworkers have been par-
ticularly lax in seeking out and reporting evidence of fraud or mis-
representation. 8 Several studies have indicated that recipients seldom
object to these visits, finding caseworkers neither overly inquisitive nor
intrusive.' 9
Since the overall aims of home visits are rehabilitative, and since
in practice most of them are minimally investigative, they are clearly
distinguishable from the "early morning" or "midnight raids" of special
investigators, practices that were ruled "unreasonable searches" in
Parrish v. Civil Service Commission of Alameda County.20 As the dis-
15. BELL, supra note 5, at 154. Bell cites the Virginia Public Assistance Manual: "Social
casework is essential in our public program in order that our services may render full
value to our communities. Assistance and other welfare services given without casework
too often increase dependency and handicap the development of the individual's capac-
ities. All... major activities of a public welfare social worker ... should be part of a
casework process .. . Id. at 237 nA. See Hoshino, The Simplification of the Means Test
and Its Consequences, 41 Soc. SERv. REv. 237, 245 (1967).
16. In determining need, all state programs consider the common law obligation of a
parent to support his minor children; in addition some states have imposed support
obligation on other relatives as well. I CCH PovEarY L. REP. § 1300, HANDLOOK pt. IV,
§ 3123. The potential challenges to these laws have been described in Sparer, Social Wel-
fare Law Testing, 12 PRAc. LAw. 14, 22-24 (April 1966); ten Brock, California's Dual
System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development & Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257
(pt. 1), 900 (pt. 2) (1964), 17 SrAN. L. REv. 614 (pt. 3) (1965).
17. W ScoNsN STATE DEPARTMENTr OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERvIcE MANUAL, Section I,
Chapter I. See Handler & Hollingsworth, supra note 14, at 44. In New York, the home
visit plays-a role in the general "social investigation" which includes both eligibility and
service functions. 18 NYCRR § 351.10.
18. Graham, Civil Liberties Problems in Welfare Administration, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv.
836, 853 (1968).
19. Handler & Hollingsworth, The Administration of Social Services and the Struc-
ture of Dependency: The Views of AFDC Recipients, 43 Soc. Stry. Rzv. 406 (1969);
Stein, Eligibility Determinations in Public Assistance: Selected Problems and Proposals
for Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U. P&. L. REv. 1307, 1333 n.143 (1967). Cf. Briar, Welfare
from Below: Recipients' View of the Public Welfare System, 54 CALM. L. RE%. 370 (1966).
20. 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967). Several commentators have
written on the subject of "early morning" or "midnight raids" in welfare, though few
have extended their inquiry to home visits in particular;, Reich, Individual Rights and
Social Welfare, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the
Social Security Act, 72 YALE I.J. 1347 (1963); Reich, Searching the Homes of Public As-
sistance Recipients, 37 Soc. SERv. R v. 143 (1963); Comment, Pre.Dawn Welfare Inspec-
tions and the Right to Privacy, 44 J. URanA LAw 119 (1966); Note, Warrantless Welfare
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sent in James v. Goldberg claims: "The purpose of the home visit is to
assist the children, not to catch the children's mother in violation of the
law."21 The routine home visit, subject to limitations on the scope of
inquiry and the times during which it may be held,22 and conducted
only by caseworkers with "professional" responsibilities to fulfill, is
arguably a very different practice from the "midnight raid." These
differences were cited by the dissenter in James as the primary justifica-
tion for requiring only administrative safeguards for the procedure,
rather than a search warrant. Indeed, the dissenter warns that the rela-
tionship will only become an adversary one if the court defines it that
way:
What the warrant will do ... is to introduce a hostile arm's length
into the relationship between the welfare worker and the mother
of the children, a relationship which can be effective only when it
is based upon mutual confidence and trust.
23
Labeling the program rehabilitative triggers assumptions about it
which serve as a shield against judicial scrutiny. The first assumption
is that the goals of the program are identical to the fundamental goals
of the client, and thus that the caseworker in administering the pro.
gram is always acting in the "client's best interests." 24
The second assumption is that the caseworker is a professional with
expertise in determining what the client's best interests are. In those
areas of the recipient's life for which rehabilitation has been pre-
scribed, the recipient is accorded no legal rights against the case-
worker's intrusion; any protection which the recipient needs can be
provided by administrative safeguards.
Given these assumptions, the court can inquire only into the suf-
ficiency of those safeguards. Prior judicial review to determine whether
the recipient's rights will be impinged is both unnecessary and inap.
propriate. It is unnecessary because to identify areas into which the
caseworker cannot intrude-the judicial definition of rights--only
allows the recipient to subvert his own best interests. It is inappro-
priate since prior judicial inquiry challenges the assumed expertise of
Searches Violate Recipients' Constitutional Rights, 19 SYR. L. Rav. 95 (1967); Bell, The
Rights of the Poor: Welfare Witchhunts in the District of Columbia, 13 SOCIAL WoRK 60
(Jan. 1968); BELL, supra note 5, at 87-92.
21. 303 F. Supp. at 946.
22. HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 2300(a). For a critique of the federal regulations, see Stein,
supra note 18, at 1333-35.
23. 303 F. Supp. at 946.
24. "Best interest' language has been found in many parts of the welfare program
See Wilkie v. O'Connor, 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.YS.2d 617 (1941).
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the caseworker and may undermine her2 relationship with her client.
The entire rationale for judicial deference depends upon the initial
assumption that the caseworker is acting in the best interests of her
client. If the area characterized as rehabilitation is too broadly defined,
or if the caseworker, despite her expertise, is failing to act in her
client's best interests, then setting her free from judicial scrutiny to
meddle in the most personal affairs of her client is insidious.
II.
While the majority in James conceded at the outset that the goals
of the home visit are benevolent,2 it nevertheless chose to characterize
the practice as a search. In doing so it recast the caseworker's relation-
ship to the recipient in an adversary mold, like that of any government
inspector to an inspectee. One basis for this conclusion might be found
in a balancing of functions: when the service and investigative roles of
the caseworker are examined, the investigative role is found to be too
important. This balancing of functions approach implies that the court
would find some mixture acceptable-that there could be a home visit
with an investigative component which would nevertheless not be a
search. But the issue is properly one of constitutional principle; if
there are elements of the home visit which constitute a search, then
either those elements must be expunged, or the practice must be stopped
altogether.
It is precisely the ambiguity of the caseworker's position-at once
investigative and rehabilitative-which makes the home visit more
difficult to characterize as a search than the usual administrative inves-
tigation cases. If there are no health code violations, for example, the
inspector in Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San
Francisco2 7 has simply made a fruitless investigation. If there is no evi-
dence of fraud or ineligibility during a home visit, however, the case-
worker has nevertheless provided needed services for her client.
Despite this ambiguity, it is difficult to maintain that a home visit has
none of the elements of a search. It is true that on any given occa-
25. The use of the adjective "her" does not imply that all public assistance case-
workers are women. Studies have shown, however, that a large majority of the less senior
caseworkers are women. KErrn-LecAs, supra note 5, at 38 n.68 (1957); Graham, Civil
Liberties Problems in IVelfare Administration, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 836, 849 (1963). Moreover,
popular stereotypes of the sodal worker are uniformly female. H. WXw,;s y & . LE-
BEAUX, IDusriAL Sociery AND SocIAI WVELFA E 323 (1965).
26. 303 F. Supp. at 942.
27. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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sion the caseworker's purpose in visiting may be undefined. She may be
there to observe a child's behavior with his parents,28 to verify a budget
adjustment, 29 or only to fulfill her statutory responsibility to visit her
client at fixed intervals.80 Her function as investigator, however, is
always potentially operative. Whatever her initial intent, if in the
course of a "routine home visit" she comes upon evidence of ineligi-
bility or fraud, however inadvertently, she is legally required to report
it.31
The determination whether the home visit is a search does not de-
pend on whether a criminal prosecution or forfeiture occurs in fact."-
As Camara emphasizes, an inspection is a search whenever the inspector
enters the home and has the authority to invoke sanctions for discov-
ered violations.33 The judicial determinants of search cannot be the
success or failure of the investigative effort, nor the resourcefulness of
the official, but rather the caseworker's capacity to investigate.
The caseworker's capacity to search during a home visit involves two
very different aspects. The first aspect is the traditional capacity to
search for tangible items.34 An unidentified man", or an expensive
28. N.Y. SocUL WELFARE LAW § 350.3 (McKinney 1966); 18 NYCRR § 369.4(b).
29. 18 NYCRR § 351.21(c)(1).
30. HANDBOOK Pt. IV, § 2200(d); 18 NYCRR § 82.1(b)(2)(i).
31. "Whenever a public welfare official has reason to believe that any person has
violated any provision of this section, he shall refer the facts and evidence available to
him to the appropriate district attorney or other prosecuting official." 18 NYCRIt
§ 348.2(b); N.Y. SociAL WELF AR LAw § 145 (McKinney 1966).
32. "To attempt to draw a distinction regarding the applicability of the Amendment
dependent upon whether the caseworker intends to counsel the recipient as to how best
to utilize his limited resources or to look for evidence of fraud, would Invite a trial of
every official's purpose-a task which would undoubtedly pervert the intent of tie
Amendment. There exists no valid reason for varying the protection afforded by tile
Amendment even assuming that the home visit is an effort to deal with a purely 'social
problem."' James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. at 942.
33. "[E]ven the most law-abiding citizen has a very tangible interest in limiting the
circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may be broken by official authority,
for the possibility of criminal entry under the guise of official sanction is a serious threat
to personal and family security." 387 U.S. at 530-31.
34. "Traditional search" as defined here relates to physical trespass into the home and
the seizure of material objects. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
35. Under the "substitute parent" rules, aid is not only denied to those othcrwlse
eligible children whose father is at home, but also to those children, for whom another
man, not their actual father, is acting as a "substitute father" according to the state's
regulations. The evidence required to establish the presence of a substitute father has
often been minimal; frequent visits to the home or even a man's presence during the
caseworker's visit may be sufficient. See 1 CCH PovERTY L. REP. 1320 at 2251.
With the decision in King v. Smith, 392 US. 309 (1968), the only relevant basis on
which a "substitute parent" regulation could be invoked is when the man so distinguished
is legally obligated to support the child. The recent Department of Health, Education and
Welfare regulations designed to implement this decision preclude a state from citing the
presence of an individual, other than one with a legal obligation to support the child, as
a basis "for a finding of ineligibility or for assuming the availability of income by the
State." 45 C.F.R. § 203.1(b) (1968).
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article like a television or washing machine" which the caseworker ob-
serves during her visit can raise the presumption of concealed income,
leading to the forfeiture of aid or perhaps prosecution for fraud. Any
number of ordinary items which she sees-household supplies, new
furniture, clothing--can cause her to reduce the recurring or special
need allowances.37
The search involved in the home visit is considerably less restricted
than the traditional search for tangible items. In a traditional warrant
search, the government official must describe in advance both the place
to be searched and the items to be seized. His authority extends only as
far as the warrant he is executing, although any unexpected illicit
items encountered within the scope of such execution may also be
seized. In a home visit, the caseworker need not specify anything before-
hand; the scope of the visit is entirely within her discretion. Any items
she sees in the course of the visit may be relevant to the determination
of need, given the complexity of the regulations governing eligibility.3s
The search is also made more extensive by virtue of the caseworker's
role as a dispenser of services. In the process of asking questions to
determine whether her client needs family counseling or child welfare
services, for example, the range of inquiry open to the caseworker is
expanded considerably beyond that available to the usual investigator.a
Aside from the search for tangible objects, the ambiguity of the
caseworker's role permits an entirely different type of search. This
search inheres in the nature of the communications between the client
and the caseworker; and it impinges on Fourth Amendment rights
whether carried on within the home or not.
36. Caseworkers are required to consider the "available resources" of the recipient in
determining eligibility as well. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7); 45 C.F.R. 203.1 (1969). This deter-
mination includes a consideration of "substitute parent" policies and relative respon-
sibility laws, in addition to a scrutiny of personal property.
18 NYCRR § 352.6 "Exploration of resources for determination of eligibility.... (g)
Personal property . . .Ownership of all other personal property including, but not
limited to, furniture, household furnishings, clothing, jewelry, automobile, . . . Jsall be
explored and analyzed with respect to determining their essentiality to the health, living
requirements, or to the production of income of the applicant or recipient, hi sprouse or
minor children, and with respect to determining the cash value of non-essenta Items.-
37. 45 C.F.R. § 203.1 (1969). See, e.g., 18 NYCRR § 353.1-353.4 (New York's regulations
on budget standards). On the caseworker's discretion in the area of budget computations,
see Graham, Civil Liberties Problems in Welfare Administration, 43 N.Y.U.L REv. 836,
890-92 (1968); Bendich, Privacy, Povertl, and the Constitution, 54 C.umI. L. Rm,. 407, 428
(1966); ten Broek 8= Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance: A Normative Eval-
uation, 1 U.CL.A.L. REv. 237 (1954); K.rr-LucAs, supra note 5, at 39.
38. KrrH-LucAS, supra note 5, at 40. 62; Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in
Welfare Administration, 54 CAUiF. I REV. 479 (1966).
39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 606(d), 625. On the range of topics caseworkers do probe, see Handler
& Hollingsworth, supra note 14.
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The framework for analyzing oral communications for Fourth
Amendment violations is provided by Katz v. United States,40 where
the attachment of a listening device to a telephone booth was held to
constitute a search because the defendant "justifiably relied"on his
words remaining private and not being used subsequently as evidence
against him in a criminal prosecution.
41
The state establishes the role of professional counselor for the case-
worker and explicitly encourages its performance. 42 It defines many
aspects of that role, some of which anticipate conversations with the
client of a very private nature.43 In talking with the client about his
medical problems, in order, for example, to dtermine whether to refer
him for treatment, the caseworker serves as the functional equivalent
of a doctor screening entering patients in a hospital, where the sub.
stance of the interview is protected as a privileged communication.
4'
The proper allocation of services within public assistance depends on
the receipt of a sufficient amount of accurate information from the
client. Against this background, the court cannot deny that reliance by
the recipient on the privacy of his communication is justifiable. In
terms of Katz, therefore, every communication between caseworker
40. 389 US. 347 (1967).
The Court in Hoffa v. United States, 885 U.S. 293 (1966), determined that there was no
unreasonable search where the government secured a friend of the defendant as an
informer and "placed" him in the defendant's hotel suite. There are two possible bases
for the Hoffa holding. The Court may be concluding that the defendant "unjustflably"
relied on the privacy of his communications since the risk that "friends" will betray
confidences is inherent in human relationships. 385 US. at 303. Where government action
is concerned, however, the public assumes only those risks which the Court has defined
as justifiable. See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. Ruv. 69, 193, 194 (1967).
Since the state encourages confidential communications with social workers, the Court
cannot label reliance on the privacy of those conversations "unjustifiable." An alternative
basis for the holding in Hoffia might be found in the Court's use of the language of "con-
sent." In the case of a home visit, consent cannot be used to justify the search, since
permitting the visit is a condition of the receipt of benefits. See p. 758 infra,
41. Id. at 353.
42. New York requires that "senior caseworkers" have social work training In addition
to possessing the "ability to establish and maintain successful relationships with peoplel
initiative, good powers of observation, perception and analysis, sensitivity to the reactions
of others, emotional maturity ... " 18 NYCRR § 98.4(d). See BELL, supra note 5, at 154,
238 n.5.
43. The welfare manuals of various states are replete with delegations to tie case-
worker of private decisions of the recipient's life; the child welfare provisions In New
York's regulations are one example. See, e.g., 18 NYCRR § 369.4; N.Y. SOCIAL WELVAE
LAw § 530(3) (McKinney 1966).
44. The Federal laws do require the caseworker to give advice on medical care. See 42
U.S.C. § 606(b). As such, it may be argued that those parts of the caseworker's conver.
sations with the client should be protected under the rubric of doctor-patient privileged
communications. 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 43.07, at 1355 n.2. It has been argued
more generally that all of the caseworker's conversations with her client should fall
under privileged communications: "To the extent that these . . . relationships depend
upon the free exchange of information or ideas between professional and client or
patient, it can satisfactorily be built only upon a foundation of complete trust." Note,
Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: its Implications for the
Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1255 (1962).
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and client in which the elements of investigation are intertwined with
service, is a search.
This is not to suggest that the intake interview or subsequent inter-
views at the welfare center designed solely to verify eligibility are
searches as well. In those instances, the purpose of the conversation is
unambiguous; from the outset it is clear that the interview is investi-
gative, and that disclosure will expose the client to reductions in aid or
even to criminal prosecution, so the client cannot justifiably rely on
the privacy of her words.45
The Katz analysis, however, does suggest that an interview at the
welfare office which retains the mixture of services and investigation
now present in the home visit would be a search. The Fourth Amend-
ment is not bounded by the home or by any specific locus. Cases in-
volving the use of electronic devices to secure criminal evidence have
led the Court to reject the "protected areas" approach 0 and to recog-
nize instead what has been called a "right to control over the informa-
tion of one's life irrespective of location."47 The opinion in Katz made
it explicit that people rather than places are protected.48
Recent cases involving administrative searches 9 have articulated
those principles which underlie the protection traditionally given the
home under the Fourth Amendment, and these cases will serve as the
basis for protecting other contexts outside the home. Search is char-
acterized by the presence of a government official who possesses exec-
utive power 0 or discretion,51 and an individual with recognized privacy
claims who is particularly vulnerable to official incursions. 2 All wel-
fare contacts have these characteristics, particularly as long as the
caseworker retains both investigative and rehabilitative capacities. A
caseworker at present has access to information relevant to all areas of
the recipient's life.53 She at once decides on eligibility, dispenses money
45. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United States, 369 U.S. 347, 351
(1967).
46. The "protected areas" doctrine was carried to its farthest extent in Hester v.
United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), where the distinction between open fields and homes or
enclosed places was made.
47. Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968, 982 (1968).
48. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
49. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 248-56 (1960) (Brennan, J. dissenting); District
of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D. Conn. 1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 1 (1950); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
50. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 252 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (1960).
51. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 532.
52. Id.
53. See Skolnick & Woodworth, The Morals Detail: Bureaucracy, Information and
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and offers services. 4 At the same time, she is required to report ev-
idence of welfare fraud 5 and to notify law enforcement officials when-
ever financial need is caused by the desertion of a parent.60 In each
area, the vagueness of the legislative framework gives the caseworker
wide discretion. With this discretion the caseworker confronts a con-
stituency completely defined by their financial dependency on the
government. Recipients are likely to be uneducated, powerless, and
wholly ignorant of their legal rights under the program.Y1
III.
A warrantless search is illegal under the Fourth Amendment unless
exceptional circumstances are shown to render the search "reasonable."
The Court has permitted the presumption of unreasonableness to be
rebutted in three classes of searches: when consent was given to the
search, when the officer was in "hot pursuit" of the suspect, or when
the search was incident to an arrest."
In a case involving a public health inspection, Frank v. Maryland,50
the Court carved out a fourth exception for administrative searches.
The interest in privacy was considered less serious in an administrative
investigation because the official enforcing the administrative code
could not immediately use the fruits of his investigation in criminal
prosecutions against the tenant, but had to proceed first by obtaining
an administrative compliance order.6 0 In addition, these searches repre-
sented only a minor intrusion in that they were designed "to make the
least possible demand on the individual occupant."
Balancing this interest in privacy against the serious interest in pro-
tecting the public health and welfare,62 the Frank court concluded that
the minor official intrusions on the privacy of the individual occupants
Social Control, Sept. 1966 (unpublished paper, prepared for the Meeting of the American
Sociological Association).
54. 18 NYCRR § 351.21.
55. N.Y. SociAl. "WErLFAE LAiw § 145 (McKinney 1966); 18 NYCRR § 384.2.
56. These have been called the NOLEO provisions (Notice to Law Enforcement
Officials). 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(11) (1969).
57. Handler, Justice for the Welfare Recipient: Fair Hearings in AFDC-The Wis.
consin Experience, 43 SOC. SERVIcE REV. 12 (1969); Handler & Rosenheim, Privacy in
Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Justice, 31 LAW & CoNvussr. Piton. 377 (1966).
58. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1967).
59. 359 US. 360 (1959).
60. Id. at 366.
61. Id. at 367.
62. Id. at 371.
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could be sufficiently curbed by administrative safeguards or redressed
by post hoc judicial review. 3
Frank was overruled by Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and
County of San Francisco,4 in which a very similar search-a housing
code inspection-was held unreasonable. According to the criteria
which Frank established, a home visit in welfare is a less reasonable
search than either a public health or a housing code inspection. Home
visits can lead to criminal sanctions5 and civil sanction directly im-
posed by the social workers," while in administrative inspections there
may be no criminal sanctions67 and civil sanctions can be imposed by
the officer only indirectly.8 The caseworker's intrusion upon the per-
sonal privacy of the welfare recipient is substantial: she is required to
visit at regular intervals9 and is empowered to inquire widely into the
recipient's life.70 The inspector of a building bothers the occupant only
to open the door, and inspections are infrequent. Finally the public
interest in health and safety is more important than the interest in
"keeping down the welfare rolls."
Distinguishing home visits from inspections may not be necessary,
since Camara rejects Frank's attempt to add a fourth class of reasonable
warrantless searches. Camara suggests that the presence of an official
investigator in the home without a warrant is per se unreasonable 
7
1
administrative safeguards are insufficient, and the practice demands
prior judicial review. Despite attempts by the lower courts to reopen
this class of reasonable warrantless searches for administrative inspec-
tions, which they distinguish from Frank and Camara," the Supreme
63. The court speaks of "due regard for every convenience of time and space." The
power of inspection was limited by the administrative requirement of reasonableness, the
requirement of daytime visits and the prohibition of forced entry. Id. at 366.
64. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
65. HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 2620.
66. Home visits are the generally accepted means of fulfilling the federal requirement
that eligibility be periodically redetermined. HANDBooK pt. IV, § 2200(d). As such, home
visits can lead to forfeiture of aid, when evidence is discovered showing the applicant to
be ineligible, or simply the immediate reduction of aid. N.Y. Soct.,. WIVtxArx LAw § 134
(iMcKinney 1966); 18 NYCRR § 351.10, 351.11, 35121.
67. 359 U.S. at 366.
68. Id. at 366.
69. Redeterminations of eligibility must be made every three months in the AFDC-UP
program, every six months in other AFDC cases and every tielve months in all other
categorical programs. Hi-DBOO pt. IV, § 2200(d). See 18 NYCRR 82.1(b)(2)(i).
70. 18 NYCRR § 351.1. "Social Investigation. (a) Definition. Social investigation is a
continuous process which is concerned with all aspects of eligibility for public assistance
or care and services from the period of initial application to case dosing."
71. "[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property
without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search
warrant." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 528. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 US. 360.
380 (1959) (Douglas, J. dissenting); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).
72. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 410 F.2d 197 (1969). appears to be a
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Court in cases like Katz v. United States73 has adopted the analysis in
Camara which categorically denies these exceptions. 74
Even if the administrative inspection class is closed, the home visit
might still be found reasonable by including it in the class of searches
justified by consent.75 In the home visit, unlike the administrative in-
spections, there is an inducement for the occupant to consent, in the
form of the benefits which the caseworker can confer. But because con-
sent cannot be given freely, the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions76 is appropriate, and no waiver can be found. The state cannot
condition the initial or continuing receipt of benefits upon the waiver
of a constitutional right; thus, the state cannot condition the services
and financial aid of welfare upon the client's waiver of his Fourth
Amendment right to refuse a home visit.
IV.
Whether the home visit is characterized as a search for tangible ob-
jects or a search for information, major changes are required in the
practice; it cannot be cured by a warrant so long as it retains the
mixture of investigation and services. The warrant procedure-limit-
ing the scope of a search to the place and the article specified in an
affidavit-is appropriate in a situation like Camara where there is only
an investigation. The scope limitation becomes meaningless, however,
when the caseworker, through her service function, has another means
of access to information.
return to a Frank type rationale in that adequate administrative safeguards coupled with
a particularly knowledgeable constituency are sufficient to convert what would have been
an unreasonable search under Camara to a reasonable one. James is distinguishcd from
Colonnade on two bases: The constituency with which caseworkers deal-welfare recipient
-are by no means knowledgeable enough to understand the limits on te caseworkers'
authority. Nor is the caseworker's authority particularly limited in home visits at all.
See note 12. See also A. KxrriH-LucAs, supra note 5, at 77, 137; Handler, Controlling
Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 479 (1966); Handler &.
Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Justice, 31 LAW & Cor'rr tu,
PRoB. 377, 384 (1966).
73. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
74. Id. at 356-57. "It is apparent that the a ents in this case acted with restraint, Yet
the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by
a judicial officer.... In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained
a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a
particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means
consistent with that end."
75. But see note 40 supra.
76. On the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, see O'Neill, Unconstitutional Con.
ditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L RV. 443 (1966); Hale,
Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 CoLuZ . L. RV. 321 (1935);
Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REy. 879 (1929), French, Unconstitu.
tional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEORGETOWN L.J. 234 (1961); Note, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 73 HRv. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
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Faced with a practice which a warrant cannot cure, the welfare
administration could conceivably choose to alter the home visit by
having the caseworker explicitly change her roles during the course
of the visit, but this would undoubtedly be counterproductive for
both investigation and services. None of the information gathered by
the caseworker in her service role could be used for other purposes; the
caseworker in her investigative role, therefore, would have to serve
warrants initiated by separate investigative units, a practice which
would be both inefficient and impracticable. The artificiality of the
change of roles would undermine the service relationship between
client and caseworker.
Alternatively, the welfare administration might choose to discon-
tinue the home visit completely and replace it by an office interview
where the caseworker performed the same mixture of functions. This
would clearly be legally unacceptable if the court found all communi-
cations between client and caseworker a search-in the sense of a
search for information. Even if the court failed to find a Fourth Amend-
ment violation, it is likely that the welfare administration would find
the office interview an inadequate setting for the caseworker's service
functions.
For both legal and administrative reasons, the only cure for welfare
administration is the complete separation of services and investigation
throughout the system.77 This separation is the principal recommen-
dation of the preliminary report of a Special Task Force of the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare. The report suggests that
the federal government alone administer money payments for public
assistance, leaving the administration of social services entirely to state
and local governments.78 Other commentators have suggested that the
eligibility determination be routinized-with a declaration system,
for example-and that the criteria for eligibility be simplified. The
purpose of the suggestion is to free caseworkers to perform "profes-
sional" functions rather than general administration. 0 Several states
77. Kahn, Social Services in Relation to Income Security: Introductory Notes, 39 Soc.
Saiv. REv. 381 (1965); Hoshino, The Simplification of the Means Test and Its Consequences,
41 Soc. SEtv. REv. 237 (1967); Bentrup, The Profession and the Means Test, 9 SoctAL
VoRuK 10 (April 1964). But see Handler & Hollingsworth, supra note 14. For a similar
suggestion with respect to the rehabilitative and control functions of parole officers, se
Note, Observations on the Administration of Parole, 79 YAL L.J. 698, 710 (1970).
78. Services for People-The Preliminary Recommendations of the Task Force on the
Organization of Social Services, 7 W-.AE IN REvIEW 9 (January 190).
79. Hoshino, The Simplification of the Means Test and Its Consequences, 41 Soc.
Snmv. Rzv. 237, 246-47. The Federal administration is currently about to implement Its
own declaration system. See 45 CF.R. § 205.20, 34 Fed. Reg. 1145 (1969).
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which have adopted such programs have created special clerical units,
separate from the professional caseworkers, concerned only with
eligibility. s0
The separation of eligibility determination and service in welfare ad-
ministration will enable the courts better to supervise both aspects of
the process, with procedures and safeguards particularly appropriate to
each. Once separated from the rehabilitative aspects of the program,
the investigation of eligibility can be recognized as an adversary pro-
ceeding. Warrants will be required when the investigation is made in
the home,"' and lawyers or welfare rights representatives may be made
available when the interview is held at the welfare center.
The rehabilitative aspects of the program raise more difficult ques-
tions. There are persuasive arguments that mandatory home visits, even
if solely rehabilitative, should be discontinued completely. Clients will
continue to be vulnerable to the caseworker's discretion so long as she
has benefits to offer;82 as a category, recipients are submissive, and
likely to remain open to the caseworker's advice on all aspects of their
lives.8 3 In addition, the difficulties of policing a professional relation-
ship8 4 are exacerbated when that relationship is carried on in a private
home rather than at the welfare center. In accord with these arguments
home visits might be totally suspended and services made available
only upon request, with adequate information about the services
provided at the welfare center.
On the other hand, it may be argued that the home visit ought to
be continued because welfare families are not likely to seek out the
caseworker for advice and information;8 r thus, many recipients may be
deprived of needed services because of ignorance or timidity. If home
visits are continued, their present form need not be retained; the case-
workers might be replaced by relatively untrained "referral" workers
whose only task would be to bring information about services to re-
80. Hoshino, supra note 79, at 242-43.
81. In the pending federal plan for the simplification of eligibility, home visits would
only be required on a spot check basis. See note 79 supra. In a spot check system, the
standards of probable cause would be very much diluted, just as in Camara, where the
court attempted to provide for area searches. 387 U.S. at 534-39. See, e.g., Note, The Fourth
Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YAu L.J. 521, 528-40 (1968). An alternative solu.
tion, one which may avoid some of these problems, would be to provide for home hnves.
tigations only when there is probable cause for suspecting fraud in that particular hom,
82. Handler & Hollingsworth, supra note 14, at 414-15,
83. Handler & Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Justi e,
31 LAw & CoNTEMP. pROB. 377, 411 (1966).
84. Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIFt. L,
R.nv. 479, 505 (1966).
85. Handler & Hollingsworth, supra note 14, at 417, 418.
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cipients, the professional services being performed completely outside
the home."" The advisability of this change would depend in part upon
the qualifications of welfare caseworkers. At present, only a small
minority of caseworkers receive sufficient professional training to
justify the discretion they are given to interfere with recipients' lives.8T
If service home visits are to be continued, the standards for caseworkers
must be raised and their training improved. If home visits continue-
whatever their form-they should be optional rather than mandatory.
(In any area of the law but welfare, it would go without saying that a
benefit should not be made mandatory.88) The client should have an
option not only to refuse a home visit, but also to refuse any service
extended within the visit. The caseworker should offer the client all
the services she needs, while at every point respecting the client's right
to refuse.
Even if home visits are optional, the court is not relieved of hedging
them with administrative safeguards. In determining what safeguards
to require, the court balances interests similar to those at issue when it
decides whether the home visit, once characterized as a search, is rea-
sonable. The interest in avoiding the intrusion of caseworkers at
regular intervals for conversations about personal matters should not
be disregarded under pressure of the public interest in allocating wel-
fare services efficiently.
Whatever the administrative safeguards imposed by the court, they
may not be sufficient if the area defined as rehabilitative is overly
broad. In those areas of the client's life consigned to the caseworker,
there may lurk individual rights. Within the framework of admin-
istrative safeguards, the caseworker's visit to the home solely to dis-
pense services appears to be impeccable. It is a rehabilitative program
whose administrator is a professional acting, admittedly under vague
criteria, in the best interest of the client. The court's temptation,
instead of attempting to define the client's rights, will be to defer to
the caseworker's discretion; it should be reminded that the home visit
too in its present form appeared impeccable before James v. Goldberg.
86. Id. at 419.
87. G. STEINER, SOCIAL INSECURITY 186-96 (1966); BELL 159-61; Graham, Civil Liberties
Problems in Welfare Administration, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 836, 848.53 (1968); H. WILENS Y &
C. LEBEAUX, INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL WELFARE 292 (1965).
88. ten Broek. The 1956 Amendments to the Social Security Act: After the New Look
-the First Thought, 6 J. PUB. L. 123, 145 (1957).
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